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We study banking policy credibility in a variant of the Diamond and Dybvig
(JPE, 1983) model. By committing to temporarily close banks during a
run, suspending the convertibility of deposits into currency, the banking
authority can eliminate the possibility of a bank run as an equilibrium
outcome. Without commitment, however, if a run were to actually occur
it may not be optimal for the authority to keep its promise to suspend
convertibility. In other words, the threat of suspension may not be credible.
We derive conditions under which a credible suspension scheme can be
used to rule out bank runs and conditions under which it cannot. In the
latter case, bank runs can occur even when there is no uncertainty about
aggregate liquidity demand. We relate the analysis to events in Argentina
in 2001, when a system-wide suspension of convertibility was declared but
only partially enforced.
We thank participants at the 2005 SAET conference in Vigo, Spain, for useful comments. The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, or the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
Bank runs were a common occurrence in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies and remain an important phenomenon around the world today. The modern literature on
bank runs, beginning with Bryant [6] and Diamond and Dybvig [11], tries to explain these events
as equilibrium outcomes of a formal economic model. This has proved to be a challenging task. An
equilibrium in which depositors run on the banking system can arise when banks offer short-term
“demand” deposits while lending for longer time horizons. Each depositor runs in this equilibrium
because she believes her bank will fail, and the run leads to this belief being fulﬁlled. However,
Diamond and Dybvig [11] showed that if there is no uncertainty about the aggregate “fundamen-
tal” demand for withdrawals, a simple policy of suspending payments to depositors after this level
of demand has been met is a costless way of eliminating the possibility of a bank run equilibrium.
This result was interpreted as saying that bank runs could only occur in environments with substan-
tial uncertainty about the normal level of withdrawal demand. Most of the subsequent literature
h a st h e r e f o r ef o c u s e do ns u c he n v i r o n m e n t s ,w i t hm i x e dr e s u l t s .
1 We show how removing the
(implicit) assumption of commitment and studying the credibility of threats to suspend payments
provides another, more natural explanation of bank runs within the Diamond-Dybvig framework.
When only credible suspension policies are allowed, a bank run equilibrium will exist under the
optimal deposit contract if depositors are sufﬁciently risk averse, even when there is no uncertainty
about fundamental withdrawal demand.
Our analysis is based on a standard version of the Diamond-Dybvig model. Depositors are
uncertain about when they will need to consume and therefore pool their resources in the banking
system for insurance purposes. By a law of large numbers, the fraction of depositors who will need
to consume early is non-stochastic. We ask if the banking authority can implement the ﬁrst-best
allocation as the unique equilibrium, or if implementing the ﬁrst best allocation necessarily intro-
ducesabankrunequilibriumaswell. DiamondandDybvigshowedhowademanddepositcontract
with a suspension of convertibility clause could uniquely implement the ﬁrst best allocation. They
went on to study an environment where the total demand for early consumption is random, which
makes suspending convertibility more problematic because the banking authority does not know
the proper point at which to suspend. While this approach offers some advantages, it has several
1 See, for example, section IV of Diamond and Dybvig [11], Postlewaite and Vives [21], Wallace [24] - [25],
Green and Lin [16], and Peck and Shell [20].
2clear drawbacks. First, the optimal contract no longer resembles a standard banking contract in
which each depositor has the right to withdraw her deposit at face value unless a suspension of
convertibility has been declared. Instead, depositors receive payments that depend on their order
of arrival at the bank in a complex way. Second, whether or not the resulting model has a run
equilibrium depends on precisely what information depositors have about the order in which they
would arrive at the bank during a run (see Green and Lin [16] and Peck and Shell [20]). Finally,
it seems intuitively implausible to think that during a bank run, the banking authority is unsure
whether a run is underway or it is simply observing an unusually high level of fundamental with-
drawal demand. Bank runs are extreme events that, once fully underway, are easily recognized.
2
We therefore conﬁne our attention to the case where the proportion of depositors who need to
withdraw early is known with certainty.
3 We take a new, more skeptical look at the suspension
policy proposed by Diamond and Dybvig. We show that the effectiveness of this policy depends
on the implicit assumption that the banking authority has full commitment power. If the banking
authority cannot commit ex ante to suspend convertibility when faced with a run, the threat to
suspend is often non-credible. In other words, if a run were to start and total withdrawals reached
the point where the banking authority had claimed it would suspend payments, the optimal policy
from that point onwards will often be to continue to serve depositors for a while longer. The
critical question is then whether a credible suspension policy can be used to implement the ﬁrst
best allocation without introducing a run equilibrium. We study this question under two sets of
assumptions. In the ﬁrst, the banking authority must either continue to allow withdrawals at face
value or suspend payments entirely. In the second case, the banking authority can declare a partial
suspension in which depositors are allowed to continue withdrawing if they wish, but at a discount.
T h ea n a l y s i si sq u i t ed i f f e r e n tf o rt h et w oc a s e s ,but the end result is the same: if depositors are
sufﬁciently risk averse, the banking authority cannot implement the ﬁrst best allocation without
also introducing a run equilibrium. Taking time consistency issues into account, therefore, shows
that the possibility of a bank run cannot be costlessly ruled out in the standard Diamond-Dybvig
framework.
These results are reminiscent of events that took place during the crisis in Argentina in 2001.
F o l l o w i n gar u no nt h eb a n k i n gs y s t e mi nl a t eN o v ember, a suspension of convertibility was an-
2 See Campbell [7] for a brief description of a run on Abacus Federal Savings Bank in New York in 2003.
3 Engineer [12] also studies this case and shows how suspension of convertibility may be ineffective at preventing
runs if depositors learn their preferences gradually over time.
3nounced. However, it was recognized that a complete suspension would place substantial hard-
ships on many depositors and, therefore, each depositor was allowed to continue to withdraw a
ﬁxed amount per week from his/her account(s). In addition, depositors could under certain cir-
cumstances obtain court orders that allowed them to withdraw all of their funds. As a result of
these policies, a substantial fraction of deposits was withdrawn from the banking system after
the suspension was declared, and these withdrawals placed additional strain on the system. Our
analysis shows how the inability to commit to a complete suspension of payments policy, which
became so patently evident during the Argentinean crisis, can severely limit the ability of a banking
authority to avoid bank runs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the basic model
and review the main results regarding demand deposit contracts without a suspension clause. In
Section 3 we examine a class of simple suspension schemes in which the banking authority must
choose to either continue paying a ﬁxed amount to depositors or close the banking system to
further withdrawals. We show that such a policy can always uniquely implement the ﬁrst-best
allocation if the banking authority can commit to it but is often not credible without commitment.
We also describe how the potential for intervention by the court system during a run can make it
more difﬁcult for the banking authority to rule out the run equilibrium. In Section 4 we allow the
banking authority to choose a partial suspension scheme in which it reschedules payments once
it discovers a run is underway. We again derive conditions under which implementing the ﬁrst-
best allocation as an equilibrium implies that the run equilibrium will also exist. In Section 5 we
provide a brief discussion of the banking crisis in Argentina, focusing on how the suspension of
convertibility was implemented. Finally, in Section 6 we offer some concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Our basic model follows the now-standard formulation of Cooper and Ross [10], which general-
izes the Diamond and Dybvig [11] environment by introducing costly liquidation and a non-trivial
portfolio choice.
2.1 The environment
There are three time periods, indexed by t =0 , 1, 2. There is a continuum of ex ante identical






where ct is consumption in periodt, θ is a binomial random variable with support{0,1}, and γ<1
holds. If therealizedvalueofθ iszero, thedepositor is impatient andonly cares aboutconsumption
in period 1. A depositor’s type (patient or impatient) is private information and is revealed to her at
the beginning of period 1. Let π denote the probability with which each individual depositor will
be impatient. By a law of large numbers, π is also the fraction of depositors in the population who
will be impatient. Note that π is non-stochastic; there is no aggregate uncertainty in this model.
The economy is endowed with one unit of the consumption good per capita in period 0.T h e r e
are two constant-returns-to-scale technologies for transforming this endowment into consumption
in the later periods. A unit of the good placed into storage in period 0 yields one unit of the good in
either period 1 or period 2. A unit placed into investment in period 0 yields either R>1 in period
2 or 1 − τ in period 1, where τ ∈ (0,1) represents a liquidation cost. In other words, investment
offers a higher long-term return than storage but is relatively illiquid in the short term.
There is also a banking technology that allows depositors to pool resources and insure against
individual liquidity risk. This technology is operated by a benevolent banking authority (BA),
whose objective is to maximize the expected utility of depositors. This authority is a reduced-form
representation of the entire banking system of the economy, together with any regulatory agencies
and other government entities that have authority over the banking system. Our analysis would be
exactly the same if there were a group of proﬁt-maximizing banks competing for deposits in period
0 and if the authority to suspend payments were held by the (benevolent) government. To keep the
presentation simple, and in line with the previous literature, we present the model with this system
represented by a single, consolidated entity.
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s .W eb e g i no u ra n a l y s i sw i t ha l le n d o w m e n t sd e p o s i t e di nt h e
banking technology.
4 In period 0, the BA divides these resources between storage and investment.
In period 1, depositors are isolated from each other and no trade can occur (as described in Wallace
[24]). However, each depositor has the ability to contact the BA, and hence the BA can make pay-
4 Because we focus only on the ﬁrst-best allocation, this assumption is without any loss of generality. In other
words, there is no need to examine what Peck and Shell [20] call the “pre-deposit game,” because implementing the
ﬁrst-best allocation requires that all endowments be deposited. (In addition, depositing is a strictly dominant strategy if
theﬁrst-bestallocationisbeinguniquelyimplemented.) ThisisthesameapproachtakeninDiamondandDybvig[11].
5ments to depositors from the pooled resources after types have been realized. Depositors choose
between contacting the BA in period 1 and waiting until period 2. Those who choose to contact the
BA in period 1 do so in a randomly-assigned order; they do not know this order when they decide
whether or not to contact the BA.
5 The payment made by the BA to a particular depositor during
period 1 can only be contingent on the number of previous withdrawals. This sequential-service
constraint captures an essential feature of banking: the banking system pays depositors as they
arrive and cannot condition current payments to depositors on future information.
2.2 The ﬁrst-best allocation
Suppose the BA could observe each depositor’s type and assign an allocation based on these types.
The allocation it would assign is called the (full information) ﬁrst best. This allocation would
clearly give consumption to impatient depositors only in period 1 and to patient depositors only in
period 2. Let cE denote the amount given to impatient depositors (who consume “early”), and cL
the amount given to patient depositors (who consume “late”). Let i denote the fraction of the total
endowment placed into investment; the remaining 1−i w o u l dg oi n t os t o r a g e .T h e nt h eB Aw o u l d











πcE =1 − i, (1)
(1 − π)cL = Ri,
cE ≥ 0,c L ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ i ≤ 0.




























5 This simplifying assumption implies that all depositors face the same decision problem, rather than facing different
problems depending on their order of arrival at the BA. Most of the results below would also hold if this order were
known. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 4.
6Notice that c∗
L >c ∗
E necessarily holds, meaning that patient depositors consume more than impa-
tient ones.
In order for the possibility of bank runs to arise, the following condition on parameter values
must hold.
Assumption 1. (1 − τ)Rγ/(1−γ) < 1.
This assumption implies that c∗
E > 1 − τi∗ holds, or that the amount of consumption given to an
impatient depositor in the ﬁrst-best allocation is greater than the per-capita liquidation value of all
assets in period 1. In other words, the banking system is illiquid in the short term. Notice that this
assumption will hold if τ is large (liquidation costs are signiﬁcant) and/or γ is small (depositors
are sufﬁciently risk averse). We maintain Assumption 1 throughout.
F o rt h er e m a i n d e ro ft h i ss e c t i o na n dt h enext, we restrict attention to the case of γ>0 so that
u(0,0;θ)=0holds. This assumption is used primarily to simplify the exposition. Our results can
be generalized to the case of γ<0 in a straightforward way by changing the utility function to
u(c1,c 2;θ)=




where b is an arbitrarily small scalar.
2.3 Demand deposit contracts
Diamond and Dybvig [11] showed how a payment schedule resembling a simple demand-deposit
contract can implement the ﬁrst-best allocation even though depositors’ types are private informa-
tion. In particular, consider the following arrangement: the BA allows each depositor to choose
whether to withdraw her funds in period 1 or in period 2. A depositor withdrawing in period 1
will receive a speciﬁed payment cE (as long as the BA has funds), while a depositor withdrawing
in period 2 will receive a pro-rata share of the matured assets. This arrangement clearly respects
the sequential service constraint. Depositors then play a game in which each chooses when to
withdraw her funds after observing her type, and the payoffs of this game are determined by the
promised payment cE together with the investment decisioni. If theBAchoosesthe policy(c∗
E,i ∗),
the (full information) ﬁrst-best allocation is an equilibrium of this game. Impatient depositors will
always choose to withdraw in period 1. A patient depositor who expects all other patient depos-
itors to wait until period 2 to withdraw anticipates receiving c∗
E if she withdraws early and c∗
L if
7she waits. Since c∗
L >c ∗
E holds, as shown above, her best response is to wait. Hence there is an
equilibrium where all patient depositors wait until period 2 to withdraw and the ﬁrst-best allocation
obtains.
Proposition 1 (Diamond and Dybvig [11])T h eﬁrst-best allocation is an equilibrium under the
policy (c∗
E,i ∗).
As Diamond and Dybvig also pointed out, however, this simple deposit contract does not
uniquely (or, fully) implement the ﬁrst-best allocation: there exists another equilibrium in which
all depositors attempt to withdraw in period 1. In this case, depositors who contact the BA early
enough receivec∗
E, while depositors who arrive late (or who deviate andwait until period2) receive
nothing. This equilibrium resembles a run on the banking system.
After pointing out this potential weakness of the demand deposit contract, Diamond and Dybvig
showed how adding a suspension of convertibility clause to the contract could render the ﬁrst-best
allocation the unique equilibrium outcome. We study suspension policies in detail in the next two
sections, beginning with the simple scheme proposed by Diamond and Dybvig.
3 Simple Suspension Schemes
Suppose the BA modiﬁesthe deposit contractstudied above by announcing a maximum fraction
of depositors that it will serve in period 1.L e tπs denote this fraction. In other words, after paying
the speciﬁed amount cE to a fraction πs of depositors in period 1, the BA will close its doors and
refuse to serve any more depositors until period 2. The policy of the BA is now summarized by the
triple (cE,i,πs).
3.1 Simple suspension with commitment
When the BA has commitment power, the cutoff point πs is chosen in period 0 and cannot be
r e v i s e di np e r i o d1. For this case, Diamond and Dybvig [11] showed that a suspension of convert-
ibility policy can implement the ﬁrst-best allocation as the unique equilibrium of the game played
by depositors.
Proposition 2 (Diamond and Dybvig [11])U n d e rt h ep o l i c y(c∗
E,i ∗,π), the ﬁrst-best allocation
is the unique equilibrium.
8The intuition behind this result is simple. If a patient depositor knows the BA will only serve
a fraction π of depositors in period 1, regardless of how many attempt to withdraw, then she is
certain the BA will have enough resources to pay at least c∗
L in period 2. Since c∗
L >c ∗
E holds,
waiting to withdraw is a strictly dominant strategy for her, and the only equilibrium has all patient
depositors withdrawing in period 2.
In fact, this result does not require that the BA suspend payments right at π; it is sufﬁcient for
the BA to suspend payments at any point whe r ei tc a ns t i l la f f o r dt og i v em o r et h a nc∗
E to depositors
who are paid in period 2. The following proposition shows that there is an interval of such values.
Proposition 3 There exists a value πT >πsuch that the ﬁrst-best allocation is the unique equi-
librium under the policy (c∗
E,i ∗,π s) for all πs ∈ [π,πT).
Proof: Deﬁne the function cL(πs) as the payoff to a patient depositor who waits until period 2
to withdraw when (i) all other patient depositors attempt to withdraw in period 1 and (ii) the BA
suspends payment after a proportion πs of depositors have withdrawn. Then we have
cL(πs)=
R(1 − τi∗ − πsc∗
E)/(1 − τ)
(1 − π)(1 − πs)
. (4)
The numerator of this expression represents the total resources of the banking system in period 2,
while the denominator represents the fraction of depositors who were not served in period 1 and











It is straightforward to show that dcL(πs)/dπs < 0 holds. In addition, there exists a value πU
s < 1
such that cL(πU
s )=0 ;this value is given by πU
s ≡ 1 − τi∗/c∗
E. Hence there is a unique value πT
such that πs <π T implies cL(πs) >c ∗
E while πs >π T implies cL(πs) <c ∗
E. (See Figure 1.)
Therefore, for any πs ∈ [π,πT), waiting is a strictly dominant strategy for patient depositors. ¤
Notice that the actual suspension point chosen does not matter as long as it is in this interval
becauseasuspensionneveroccursinequilibrium. Inthisway, theBAisabletocostlesslyeliminate
6 We assume that impatient depositors who are not served in period 1 do not contact the BA in period 2 since
they have no desire to consume. Our main results would also hold if these depositors did contact the BA and receive a
share of the remaining funds.
9Figure 1: Payoff in period 2 after a suspension at πs
the possibility of bank runs when it can commit to a simple suspension scheme.
7
3.2 Simple suspension without commitment
The analysis in the previous subsection relies heavily on the assumption that the BA commits to
the suspension scheme in period 0. If, instead, the BA can re-evaluate its decision after it discovers
that a run is underway in period 1, would it want to actually follow through with the threat to
suspend? Consider a situation where the BA, attempting to implement the ﬁrst-best allocation,
has already paid out c∗
E to a fraction π of depositors and then some additional depositors arrive to
withdraw in period 1. The BA recognizes that the fraction of depositors attempting to withdraw in
period 1 will be either π or 1. (In other words, the BA knows that patient depositors will play a
symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium of the game.) If more than π depositors attempt to withdraw,
a run must be underway and the BA realizes that some of the money it has already paid out was
given to depositors who are actually patient. Furthermore, it knows that some impatient depositors
have not yet been served and will be attempting to withdraw. Suspending convertibility implies
giving nothing to these depositors, which may be very costly from a social point of view, and hence
the BA may not want to suspend payments right away.
We now consider credible suspension policies, in which the suspension point announced in
7 Gorton [15] offers another interpretation of the role of suspension clauses in demand deposit contracts. When
the value of a bank’s assets is random and a suspension triggers a costly state-veriﬁcation process, the suspension
can be ex post Pareto improving. Credibility issues are evidently not as relevant in such settings as they are here.
10period 0 must equal what the BA would choose if it actually faced a run in period 1.
8 We ask if
such a policy can be used to implement the ﬁrst-best allocation as the unique equilibrium, or if the
run equilibrium will also exist when the BA tries to implement the ﬁrst best. The BA’s objective
in period 1 is the same as it was in period 0: to maximize the expected utility of depositors, which
is equivalent to the weighted average of utilities after types have been realized. Once the BA
discovers a run is underway, it will choose the suspension point πs that maximizes











This objective recognizes that, of the 1 − πs depositors who are not served in period 1,af r a c t i o n
1 − π will be patient and return in period 2. The remaining fraction π will be impatient and will
receive nothing, leaving them with a utility level of zero. Let πM
s denote the value of πs that
maximizes (5). By Proposition 3, the effectiveness of the credible suspension policy in preventing
a run depends crucially on whether πM
s i ss m a l l e ro rl a r g e rt h a nπT, the threshold suspension
point for eliminating the run equilibrium. (See Figure 1.) If it is smaller, the BA would choose







a patient depositor is better off waiting than participating in the run. In this case, the credible
suspension scheme generates the ﬁrst-best allocation as a unique equilibrium; bank runs will not
occur. However, if πM
s is greater than πT, the BA would suspend payments relatively late when
f a c e dw i t har u na n dd e p o s i t o r sw h ow a i tt ow i t h d r a ww i l lr e c e i v el e s st h a nc∗
E. A patient depositor
who expects others to run will, therefore, choose to run as well and the bank run equilibrium exists.
We ﬁrst show that when the fraction of impatient depositors in the population is small enough,
the BA would choose to immediately suspend convertibility when facing a run.
Proposition 4 Given all other parameter values, there exists a value π ∈ (0,1) such that πM
s = π
holds if and only if π ≤ π.
8 Our use of the word credible follows that in Mailath and Mester [18] and differs somewhat from that in Stokey
[22], where the focus is on reputational equilibria in dynamic games. We view our approach as applying the time
consistency notion of Kydland and Prescott [17] to policies that lie potentially off the equilibrium path; this can
also be viewed as a form of subgame perfection. See the related work of Bassetto [4], which is also concerned
with the speciﬁcation of government policy along potentially off-equilibrium paths and shows how multiplicity of
equilibria is more common than previously thought. His approach, however, assumes commitment and only requires
that announced policies be feasible along all possible paths of play. In our setting, suspension is always feasible











1−γ − (πs − π) R
1−τ
(1 − πs)(1− π)
. (7)





(πs − π +( 1− πs)(1 − π)A(πs)
γ).
















The optimal suspension point will equal π i fa n do n l yi fW0 (π) ≤ 0 holds. Evaluating (8) at
πs = π and solving this inequality for π yields












This result demonstrates that for some parameter values, the BA can uniquely implement the ﬁrst-
best allocation using a credible suspension policy. When relatively few depositors have a real
need to consume early, the cost of closing the banking system’s doors and giving these depositors
nothing is relatively small. In addition, a large proportion of any additional payments made in
period 1 w o u l dg ot od e p o s i t o r sw h oa r ea c t u a l l yp a t i ent. The optimal response to a run in this
case is to suspend convertibility right away and preserve a high payment to the relatively large
number of patient depositors in period 2.
When π is greater than π, however, the BA would not ﬁnd it optimal to suspend convertibility
at π in the event of a run. Rather, it would balance the costs and beneﬁts of suspending, and the








12As discussed above, the critical question is whether the resulting value of πM
s is larger or smaller
than πT, the threshold beyond which the run equilibrium exists. The main result of this section
shows that, for some parameter values, it is larger. In these cases, the BA would choose to wait
“too long” before suspending convertibility when faced with a run and, as depositors anticipate
this reaction when making their withdrawal decision, the run equilibrium exists. In other words,
t h e r ee x i s tc a s e sw h e r et h eB Acannot uniquely implement the ﬁrst-best allocation using a credible
suspension policy. The following proposition gives the precise conditions under which this does
and does not occur.
Proposition 5 A credible simple suspension policy can generate the ﬁrst-best allocation as the










Proof: The credible suspension policy discussed above generates a unique equilibrium if and only
if πM






Using (8) and the fact that A
¡
πT¢
=1h o l d s( s e e( 6 )a n dF i g u r e1), this condition becomes




Straightforward manipulations then yield (9). ¤
Notice that (9) will necessarily hold if the right-hand side of the inequality is greater than one,





If this condition holds, depositors are relatively close to being risk neutral and it is not very costly
to have some impatient depositors receive zero consumption. In this case, the credible suspension
point is early enough to eliminate the run equilibrium for any value of π.Depositors must exhibit a
minimal amount of risk aversion for bank runs to be an issue. On the other hand, notice that for any
given value of π, condition (9) will be violated if gamma is small enough. In other words, regard-
less of the other parameter values, the bank run equilibrium will exist if depositors are sufﬁciently
13risk averse. We state this result in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If depositors are sufﬁciently risk averse, the ﬁrst-best allocation cannot be uniquely
implemented by a credible simple suspension policy.
3.3 Discussion
The results above give conditions under which a bank-run equilibrium exists when the BA attempts
toimplementtheﬁrst-bestallocation. Wouldabankrunactuallyoccurinsuchcases? Thisquestion
raises the difﬁcult issue of equilibrium selection, which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
However, the existing literature offers a fair amount of guidance on how the issue can be dealt
with. The most common approach is to assume that depositors condition their actions on the
realization of an extrinsic, commonly-observed “sunspot” variable; the run equilibrium is played
if spots appear on the sun and the no-run equilibrium is played if they do not. The probability of a
run is then equal to the (exogenous) probability of sunspots.
9
From the standpoint of the present paper, the important point is that the existence of the run
equilibrium will create costly distortions regardless of the probability assigned to it by the sunspots
selection mechanism. If this probability is high enough, the BA will choose a “run-proof” contract,
which offers less liquidity insurance than the ﬁrst-best allocation but makes withdrawing in period
2 a dominant strategy for patient depositors. If the probability of a run is low, the BA will choose
a contract that is not run proof, and a bank run will occur with positive probability in equilibrium.
Even if a run does not occur, however, the allocation that is implemented will again not be the ﬁrst
best because the ex ante possibility of a run distorts the optimal deposit contract (see Cooper and
Ross [10] and Ennis and Keister [14]). In other words, unless one arbitrarily assigns a probability
of zero to the run equilibrium, its existence introduces distortions which imply that the ﬁrst-best
allocation cannot be achieved. We do not focus on the exact nature of these distortions here.
Rather, our goal in this paper is to show how taking time-consistency issues into account reveals
that the problem of bank runs is more pervasive than was previously thought. Even in the stan-
dard Diamond-Dybvig framework with no uncertainty about the level of fundamental withdrawal
demand, in some cases the possibility of a bank run cannot be costlessly ruled out.
10
9 This approach was suggested in Diamond and Dybvig[11, p. 410] and explicitly taken in Cooper and Ross[10],
Peck and Shell [20], and others.
10 The issues discussed here are not unique to models of bank runs; they arise in any environment where multiple
143.4 Court intervention
In addition to suspending convertibility, there are a variety of other ways in which a banking
authority or government might deal with the occurrence of a bank run. One notable feature of the
banking crisis in Argentina in 2001 was the involvement of the court system. Depositors claiming
to have urgent ﬁnancial needs (due, for example, to illness or hospitalization) could ﬁl eal e g a l
recourse requesting withdrawal of some or all of their funds from the banking system while the
suspension was in place. Nearly two hundred thousand such cases were ﬁled between December
2001 and June 2003, and the courts awarded payments to depositors totaling over 14 billion pesos.
(See Section 5 for a detailed discussion and breakdown of these ﬁgures.) This process was based
on the presumption that the courts had at least some ability to differentiate between depositors
who needed funds urgently and those who did not. In this section we show how such veriﬁcation
power can make it more difﬁcult for the BA to uniquely implement the ﬁrst-best allocation. By
i m p r o v i n gt h ea b i l i t yt oa l l o c a t e resources once a run is underway, a court intervention can make
suspending payments less attractive and thereby undermine the BA’s ability to commit to policies
that are desirable ex ante.
Suppose that once the BA discovers a run is underway, the court system intervenes and deter-
mines the true type of each remaining depositor. In principle, one would expect verifying types
to involve some administrative costs. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we abstract from
such costs: we assume that type veriﬁcation occurs costlessly, but only after π depositors have
already withdrawn. The latter part of this assumption prevents the BA from using the courts to
completely overcome the private information problem. With a positive veriﬁcation cost, the BA
would choose not to screen the types of the ﬁrst π individuals to withdraw because it is trying to
implement the ﬁrst-best allocation. Our results below would then hold as long as the cost is low
enough that using the veriﬁcation technology is desirable ex post. We present the limiting case
where the cost is zero only because it simpliﬁes the expressions involved.
If the courts intervene after a suspension has been declared, they will award c∗
E to the remaining
π(1 − π) impatient depositors in period 1.T h e(1 − π)
















equilibria are possible and a policymaker makes some decisions before knowing which equilibrium will be played. See
Bassetto and Phelan [5] and Ennis and Keister [13] for discussions of these issues in models of optimal taxation.
15in period 2. What action would a patient depositor take at the beginning of period 1 if she expects
other patient depositors to run and a suspension to be followed by a court intervention? If c∗
LC >c ∗
E
holds, she would wait until period 2 to withdraw and the run equilibrium would not exist. In
this case, the BA and courts together can uniquely implement the ﬁrst-best allocation; note that
the court system will not be used in equilibrium because a run will not occur. However, if the
inequality is reversed she would choose to run and hence the run equilibrium will exist. The
following proposition characterizes the set of parameter values for which each case occurs.
Proposition 6 A deposit contract together with court intervention can generate the ﬁrst-best al-
location as the unique equilibrium if and only if we have
π<
(1 − τ)







Once again we see that uniquely implementing the ﬁrst-best allocation is possible only if there
are relatively few impatient depositors. It is int e r e s t i n gt oc o m p a r e( 1 1) with condition (9) in
Proposition 5. Recall that (9) is the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the run equilibrium to
not exist when the BA uses a credible simple suspension scheme and the courts cannot intervene.
Straightforward algebra shows that when liquidation costs are high, condition (11) is stronger
than condition (9). In such cases, there exist intermediate values of π such that (i) without court
intervention the credible simple suspension scheme uniquely implements the ﬁrst-best allocation,
but (ii) with court intervention the run equilibrium exists. We formalize this result in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2 Given all other parameter values, there exists ˆ τ ∈ [0,1) such that for all τ ≥ ˆ τ,
condition (9) holds but condition (11) is violated for an interval of values for π.
In other words, court intervention can undermine the ability of the BA to uniquely implement
the most desirable allocation. We can go a step further and ask whether or not the (benevolent) BA
would actually want the courts to intervene. Corollary 2 shows that, at least for some parameter
values, in period 0 the BA would like to commit to not allowing the courts to intervene in the event
of a run. However, it is not difﬁcult to show that for some of these same parameter values, in
period 1 the BA would choose to allow the courts to intervene once a run is underway because they
lead to a better allocation of resources. In this sense, the possibility of using the courts to verify
16depositors’ types introduces a new kind of time-inconsistency problem. Even in cases where a
credible simple suspension scheme would be able to eliminate the possibility of a bank run, the
i n a b i l i t yt oc r e d i b l yr u l eo u tac ourt intervention in the event of a run could render the banking
system vulnerable to a run.
4 Partial suspension schemes
The policies studied above place a somewhat artiﬁcial restriction on the suspension scheme: the
BA must pay c∗
E to all depositors it serves in period 1. We now relax this restriction and let the BA
choose what the literature calls a partial suspension scheme. Because it is attempting to implement
the ﬁrst-best allocation, the BA will still pay c∗
E to the ﬁrst π depositors who withdraw in period
1. However, if more than π depositors attempt to withdraw in period 1, the BA can choose any
continuation of the payment schedule that it sees ﬁt. This may involve offering payments smaller
than c∗
E, partially suspending the convertibility of deposits, in addition to potentially suspending
payments altogether.
If the BA declares a partial suspension and begins offering a payment of less than c∗
E,ap a t i e n t
depositor who had chosen to run but had not yet been served may prefer to come back in period
2 rather than accept this smaller payment. We allow depositors to do this. In other words, after
π w i t h d r a w a l sh a v et a k e np l a c ea n dap a r t i a ls u s p e nsion has been declared, depositors who have
not yet withdrawn play a continuation game in whi c ht h e ye a c hd e c i d ea g a i nw h e t h e rt ow i t h d r a w
in period 1 or in period 2. It is possible that play in this continuation game will correspond to
a continued run on the banking system, or the partial suspension may halt the run. The optimal
payments for the BA to offer in a partial suspension depend on what it anticipates depositors will


















11 Note that the solution to this problem is the ﬁrst-best allocation for the continuation economy after π agents
have each received c∗
















cE ≥ 0 and cL ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst constraint reﬂects the fact that all of the resources in storage have already been paid
out to the ﬁrst π depositors who withdrew. Additional payments in period 1 c a no n l yc o m ef r o m
liquidating investment. Also note that since the BA expects the new payment schedule to deter
patient depositors from running, only a proportion π of the (1 − π) depositors who have not yet
withdrawn are expected to withdraw in period 1. The second constraint is the standard pro-rata


























If γ is positive, it is easy to see that the solution satisﬁes
(1 − π)c
∗
ER ≤ (1 − τ)i
∗.
In this case, the BA has enough resources to pay c∗
ER to all remaining depositors in period 1.A
depositor who waits until period 2 would then receive more than c∗
ER, even if all other depositors
withdraw in period 1, and therefore waiting until period 2 to withdraw is a dominant strategy
for patient depositors following the rescheduling of payments. In other words, the continuation
contractisrunproof, andtheBA’sexpectationthattherunwouldbehaltedmustclearly befulﬁlled.
Given that depositors know the BA would respond to a run by changing the payments to
(c∗
ER,c ∗
LR), thereby halting the run, does an equilibrium exist where patient depositors run at the
beginning of period 1? A patient depositor who believes that all other depositors are running will
have an expected payoff of π 1
γ (c∗
E)
γ +( 1− π)1
γ (c∗
LR)
γ if she also runs, but will receive c∗
LR for




E holds and, therefore, the depositor would prefer not to run. In other words, the
run equilibrium does not exist when γ is positive. We summarize this discussion in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 For γ ∈ [0,1), a credible partial suspension policy can generate the ﬁrst-best
allocation as the unique equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that the continuation game after π depositors have withdrawn during
ar u nr e s e m b l e st h eo r i g i n a lD i amond-Dybvig model, which had a single asset and no portfolio
decision. The analysis above shows that, as in Diamond and Dybvig [11], the ﬁrst-best allocation
in the continuation game is run proof if the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is smaller than one.
Proposition 7 shows that this result has important implications for our full model: if γ is positive,
then, regardless of the size of the liquidation cost τ,a credible suspension scheme will allow the
banking authority to achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation without having to worry about the possibility
of a run.
The parallel between our continuation game and the original Diamond-Dybvig model suggests
that the results may be very different when γ<0 holds.
12 In this case, we have (1 − π)c∗
ER >
(1 − τ)i∗ andthecontinuationcontractisnotrun-proof. Thepossibilityofaruninthecontinuation
game substantially complicates the analysis. The decision of a patient depositor to run or not at
the beginning of period 1 will now be inﬂuenced not only by the payments offered under the
suspension scheme, but also by her assessment of the probability that the suspension would halt
the run. In other words, the issue of equilibrium selection in the continuation game necessarily
comes into play.
Our interest is solely in whether or not there exists an equilibrium of the overall game in which
all depositors attempt to withdraw at the beginning of period 1. To keep matters simple, we focus
on equilibria in which the BA and depositors believe that a run will halt after the BA declares a
partialsuspension. Inotherwords, we(arbitrarily)selecttheno-runequilibriumofthecontinuation
game. More generally, one could introduce a sunspot variable and study situations in which there
is a positive probability of both the run and the no-run equilibrium being played. Focusing on this
12 Inthe analysis that follows, thereareno circumstancesin whichsome depositors receivezeroconsumption. We can
therefore study the case where the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is greater than one without changing the form of
the utility function to (3).
19one (fairly extreme) case, however, is sufﬁcient for establishing our point, and it allows us to give
a relatively simple sufﬁcient condition for the run equilibrium to exist in the overall game.
Suppose a patient depositor believes all other depositors will initially attempt to withdraw in
period 1, but the partial suspension given by (12) will halt the run. Would she choose to participate
in the run? If she does, she will receive c∗
E with probability π and c∗
LR with probability (1 − π).
She would choose to run, and hence the run equilibrium will exist in the overall game, if c∗
LR ≤ c∗
E
holds. Using the deﬁnitions of c∗
E,i ∗, and c∗
















We state this result as the following proposition.
Proposition 8 A credible partial suspension policy cannot generate the ﬁrst-best allocation as
the unique equilibrium if (13) holds.
It is worth emphasizing precisely what this proposition says. When (13) holds, there is an
equilibrium where all depositors attempt to withdraw their funds in period 1. The BA pays c∗
E to
a fraction π of these depositors and then declares a partial suspension. Impatient depositors who
contact the BA after the suspension has been declared receive c∗
ER, while patient depositors who
have not yet been served decide not to contact the BA in period 1 and instead receive c∗
LR in period
2. There may be other equilibria in which, for example, the partial suspension does not halt the
run and the BA must suspend payments a second t i m e( a n dp o s s i b l yat h i r dt i m e ,a n ds oo n ) .W e
do not study such equilibria here because our interest is in whether or not the ﬁrst-best allocation
can be uniquely implemented. Once we have constructed an equilibrium in which depositors run
at the beginning of the period, the answer is clearly negative.
It is worth emphasizing that the set of contracts we study in this section is completely general.
The BA must pay c∗
E to the ﬁrst π depositors who withdraw in order for there to be an equilib-
rium that implements the ﬁrst-best allocation. After these payments are made, we allow for any
possible continuation contract. We differ from the existing literature in requiring that the choice
of contract be optimal for the continuation economy; in fact, the ﬁrst-best continuation allocation
is implemented in the run equilibrium we construct. The existence of the run equilibrium in our
setting is, therefore, not the result of the “simple contracting” approach of Diamond and Dybvig
20(see Green and Lin [16]). It is also worth noting that our results would not change if depositors
knew the order in which they would contact the BA in period 1 before deciding when to withdraw
their funds. Patient depositors who will contact the BA after a suspension has been declared decide
(in the run equilibrium) to delay withdrawing until period 2, but any patient depositor who knows
she will arrive before the suspension is declared strictly prefers to withdraw early.
13
Notice that (13) will not hold if π is close to zero, which is reminiscent of Propositions 4 and
5 in the earlier sections. When there are relatively few impatient depositors, a run is discovered
quickly and sufﬁcient assets remain for it to be optimal to offer a relatively large payment in
period 2 under the partial suspension. If the partial suspension will halt the run, this large payment
r e m o v e st h ei n c e n t i v ef o rp a tient depositors to run in the ﬁrst place. Also notice that, consistent
with Proposition 7, (13) cannot hold if γ is positive. However, if γ is negative then for high enough
values of the liquidation cost τ, the inequality does hold. In other words, if the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion is greater than one, a run equilibrium will exist whenever liquidation costs
are large.
Corollary 3 When γ is negative, there exists τ such that for all τ ∈ [τ,1) the ﬁrst-best allocation
cannot be uniquely implemented by a credible partial suspension policy.
Villamil [23] suggests that banks could commit to suspending convertibility by making invest-
ments that cannot under any circumstances be liquidated (and shows how the optimal lending
contract can have this property in some settings). This idea can be captured in our notation by set-
ting τ =1 , in which case suspending payments after all liquid assets have been depleted is clearly
credible. However, Corollary 3 points out the knife-edge nature of this argument. If liquidation is
difﬁcult but not impossible (i.e., τ is close to but not equal to 1), the banking authority will choose
to liquidate some investment when faced with a run even if doing so is extremely costly and, as a
result, the run equilibrium is certain to exist.
Given a value of the liquidation cost (and all other parameter values), (13) will necessarily
hold if γ is small enough. The result in Proposition 8 can therefore be stated another way: the
banking authority cannot implement the ﬁrst-best allocation without introducing a run equilibrium
if depositors are sufﬁciently risk averse.
13 In other words, it does not matter if we adopt the Green and Lin [16] assumption that depositors know their
time of arrival at the BA or the Peck and Shell [20] assumption that they do not. The backward-induction based
argument used by Green and Lin cannot be applied to the equilibrium we construct.
21Corollary 4 Thereexistsγ<0suchthatforallγ ≤ γ theﬁrst-bestallocationcannotbeuniquely
implemented by a credible partial suspension policy.
T os u m m a r i z e ,w eh a v es h o w nh o wt i m e - c o n s i s tency issues may undermine the ability of a
banking authority to achieve desirable allocations. In a standard Diamond-Dybvig environment
where only credible suspension schemes are allowed, in many cases the BA cannot engineer a pol-
icy that implements the ﬁrst-best allocation as the unique equilibrium of the strategic interaction
among depositors. In the next section, we discussh o wt h e s et y p e so fp r o b l e m sl i m i t e dt h ee f f e c -
tiveness of the suspension scheme imposed by the government of Argentina during the banking
crisis of 2001.
5 Suspension of Convertibility in Argentina in 2001
During the economic expansion in Argentina in the 1990s, total deposits in the banking system
grew from less than 10% to almost 30% of GDP. As the banking system became more important,
it also became highly dollarized.
14 By 1999 the proportion of deposits denominated in foreign
currency (US dollars) was close to 60%. For a variety of reasons, including adverseexternal shocks
and increased political instability, by the end of the year 2000 the risk of a peso devaluation had
increased signiﬁcantly. Since the banking sys t e mw a sd o l l a r i z e d ,ad e v a l uation was directly linked
to insolvency. Dollarized loans implied that a devaluation would leave a large portion of debtors
unable to pay back their commitments, since their earnings were not pegged to the dollar. As a
result, the banking system, which had become an important part of the economy, was increasingly
under strain.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of total deposits in the banking system between the beginning of
2001 and the middle of 2002. In July and August of 2001, deposits fell by 8.5 billion dollars (10%)
and the system became further dollarized. In September, Argentina reached an agreement with the
IMF and expectations improved. During that month, the system gained deposits. However, in
October and November, the political situation worsened and deposits started to fall again. In the
14 Effectively, the banking system in Argentina had a signiﬁcant proportion of what could be considered real con-
tracts, which makes the use of Diamond-Dybvig and related models especially appropriate. Recently, a number of pa-
pers have dealt with the issue of liquidity provision in systems with nominal contracts, where additional liquid-
ity can be created by printing more currency. (See, for example, Champ et al. [8], Allen and Gale [2],A n t i -
nolﬁ et al. [3], and Martin [19].) The fact that a large proportion of contracts in Argentina were dollarized
makes such models less applicable.
22last two days of November deposits fell 2.5 billion dollars (3%) and the government decided to
suspend convertibility. Initially, the rule established a type of partial suspension for 90 days and
statedthatduringthisperioddepositorscouldwithdrawamaximumof$1,000permonthfromeach
account. It should be noted, though, that depositors were allowed to move their balances from one
bank to another and make certain payments as long as the funds stayed within the banking system.
International outﬂows were heavily restricted.
























Total Deposits (Million of Pesos)
Devaluation
Suspension
Source: Ministry of the Economy and Production of Argentina.
In spite of the suspension, deposits continued falling during the month of December (at the
pace allowed by the partial restrictions on availability). At the same time, deposits ﬂowed towards
a select group of institutions that the public perceived as better positioned to confront the crisis.
This ﬂow of funds within the system created a liquidity crunch in those institutions outside the
select group and in late December the government created a Bank Liquidity Fund to assist the
most troubled institutions. All banks in the system contributed to the Liquidity Fund. The creation
of this Fund is conceptually important because it demonstrates the importance of studying liquidity
shortages at the level of the banking system as a whole and not at the level of an individual bank.
At the time of the devaluation (January 11, 2002), 70% of deposits were denominated in dollar
terms. These deposits were converted into pesos using the ofﬁcial exchange rate of 1.4 pesos per
dollar. Thepartialsuspensionremainedinplace. Depositorsrespondedtothecontinuedsuspension
23by ﬁlling legal recourses. By April 2002 more than 28 thousand cases were favorably resolved in
court and the payments corresponding to those cases contributed to an extra 2.3 billion pesos of
reduction in deposits. Legal recourses continued being ﬁled and during the year 2002 more than
150 thousand cases were resolved (see Table 1). Of the value of total deposits in the system as
of March 2002 (around 65 billion pesos) more than 18% were paid out to depositors via legal
recourse.
Illness and other urgent personal ﬁnancial needs were common justiﬁcations given for court rul-
ings in favor of depositors. The average size of the payment in a typical legal case was fairly stable
across time.
15 In the ﬁrst ﬁve months of the suspension the average payment was $82 thousand
p e s o s ,f a l l i n gl a t e rt o$ 7 5t h o u s a n dp e s o si nt h es e c o n dh a l fo f2 0 0 2a n d$ 6 0t h o u s a n di nt h eﬁrst
half of 2003. These numbers are not much different from the average size of individual deposits in
the system during the ﬁrst half of 2001, which was around $23 thousand pesos (equivalent to $70
thousand pesos in 2002).














Dec., 2001-April, 2002 28,430 2,346 1,312 82,518
May.-June, 2002 28,285 2,124 1,026 75,093
Dec., 2001-June, 2002 56,715 4,470 2,338 78,815
July-Dec., 2002 92,926 7,109 3,834 76,502
Jan.-June, 2003 42,249 2,437 1,643 57,682
Total (Dec. 2001 - June 2003) 191,890 14,016 7,815 73,042
Note: Court Cases (“Amparos”) stands for court-ordered repayments of individuals’ frozen deposits. Banks’ deposit
liabilities were accounted in pesos after converting dollar deposits into pesos at the 1.4 ofﬁcial exchange rate (the liability
also includes the indexation called CER). However, some payments to depositors (second column) were made for the dollar
amount of the deposits (according to court rule). Hence, total payments (in pesos) tends to be larger than the accounting
value (third column).
The banking crisis in Argentina in 2001 highlights the practical limitations of a suspension of
convertibility scheme. While the suspension did reduce the outﬂow of funds from the banking
system in December 2001, two features limited its effectiveness. First, it was politically infeasible
for the government to order a complete suspension. Many depositors needed access to at least
15 Somewhat surprisingly, this data does not suggest that large depositors were the ﬁr s tt ob es u c c e s s f u li nc o u r t .
24some of their funds for daily living expenses, and granting this partial access led to a slow but
steady “leaking” of funds out of the system. Second, the government could not stop the courts
from allowing an additional leakage of funds after the suspension was declared. These issues
correspond to precisely the type of commitment problems studied in the previous sections. In
particular, it seems plausible that the anticipation of the lack of full commitment to the suspension
scheme could have been an important factor in motivating the initial run in late November 2001.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Credibility and time-inconsistency issues are pervasive in economics and have been studied
extensively. In banking theory, however, theimportance ofpolicycredibilityhas receivedrelatively
little attention, apart from often informal treatments of bank bailouts.
16 In this paper, we analyze
for the ﬁrst time the credibility limitations associated with policies designed to respond to a run on
the banking system. We ﬁnd that such limitations can be important and may render some of the
most commonly-proposed policies ineffective in preventing a run. If commitment to a suspension
of payments is hard to guarantee, the problems associated with bank runs may be more pervasive
than previously thought. In particular, bank runs are a relevant issue even in the simple framework
of Diamond and Dybvig [11].
W eu s et h i ss i m p l ef r a m e w o r kf o ro u ra n a l y s i sb e c a u s ei ti sw i d e l yk n o w na n di ta l l o w su s
to present our ideas in a clear and transparent way. Many of the simplifying assumptions in this
model, however, are not essential for our purposes. For example, assuming that there is no ag-
gregate uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal demand, and hence that the banking authority
knows the exact point at which suspending payments is appropriate, may be considered extreme.
Changing the model so that the fraction of depositors who are impatient is random will complicate
matters, but our insights will remain valid as long as the support of the distribution is not too large.
What is important for our analysis is that there is a upper bound on the level of normal withdrawal
demand, and that suspending payments to depositors once this bound is reached would rule out the
possibility of a self-fulﬁlling bank run. In any such setting, the credibility of the threat to suspend
comes into question and the issues highlighted in this paper are relevant.
The ability of a banking authority to commit to suspending payments in reality is likely to de-
16 Two notable exceptions are Mailath and Mester [18] and Acharya and Yorulmazer [1], both of which deal with
policies regarding bank closure.
25pend on how long the banking system needs to remain closed in order for the “panic” to subside.
If the actual time lapse between periods 1 and 2 in the model corresponds to only a day or two,
the fraction of depositors who need access to their funds during that period is probably rather
small. This case corresponds, therefore, to a low value of π in the model. Our results (see espe-
cially Propositions 4 and 5) show that if π is low enough, a credible suspension policy often can
uniquely implement the ﬁrst-best allocation. In other words, if only a short suspension of payments
is required, commitment is less likely to be problematic. The longer the time period involved, how-
ever, the more difﬁcult it becomes for the banking authority to commit to a suspension. It was clear
to observers that the banking crisis in Argentina was not likely to be sorted out quickly, which un-
doubtedly made commitment to a complete suspension of payments more difﬁcult and may have
contributed ex ante to individuals’ decisions to run. This reasoning suggests that a banking system
with fundamental weaknesses, where a longer suspension of payments would likely be required,
should be more susceptible to a run than a system that is fundamentally sound. Formalizing this
argument would require a more fully dynamic model and seems a promising avenue for future
research.
Studying suspension policies in a longer-horizon setting would introduce other interesting is-
sues. It is well known, for example, that reputational concerns can substitute for commitment in
some settings. (See Stokey [22] and Chari and Kehoe [9].) The extent to which the desire to build
a reputation for being “tough” in the face of a run would enable the banking authority to credibly
suspend payments (and thereby rule out runs) is an interesting question. The answer will likely
depend on how, if ever, the reputation is tested given that bank runs potentially lie off the equi-
librium path. While these difﬁcult issues are beyond the scope of the present paper, we believe
that our analysis provides a critical ﬁrst step by highlighting their relevance. Once it is recognized
that suspension of convertibility policies may not be time consistent even in simple settings, issues
of both static and dynamic credibility become important and the classic model of Diamond and
Dybvig becomes a natural benchmark for their study.
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